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ABSTRACT

The research focus of this study is the voting behavior
of the elected members of the United States House of Representatives on the

issue of

national

This work

immigration.

specifically focuses on selected immigration roll call votes
taken during the 99th and 104th Congresses.

An examination of

the voting behavior of the 435 elected representatives from
each year will be examined by considering eight hypotheses
that question the immigration voting behavior of various sub
groups within congress.
During the 1980s and 1990s Congress took several major
legislative
immigration.

actions

in

regards

to

the

issue

of

national

It was hypothesized that not only the tone, but

the voting manner of the United States House of Representatives,

has

become

more

during that period.

restrictive
In

examining

on

immigration

the

results

issues
of

the

hypothesis a clear distinction between the voting behavior of
the House in 1986, and the voting behavior of the House in
1996 became apparent.
become

more

Also, the Republican party has clearly

supportive

of

greater

immigration

controls,

whereas their Democrat counterparts have remained constant in
their support for less restrictive immigration policies.

In

a final analysis of the two Houses a pattern of polarization
in

immigration

voting was

evident,

with

the

majority

of

movement being towards the more restrictive end of the scale.
In conclusion it was found that support for more restrictive immigration policies has grown between the 99th Congress
and the 104th Congress,

and that this support has not been

confined solely to the Republican party.

It was also found

that immigration has become a more divisive issue, both within
the two parties and within the House overall.

A more conser-

vative viewpoint on immigration is now the norm in the United
States House of RepresentativesDEDICATION
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Chapter One
Immigration: Back to the Fore

Research Question
This study focuses on the voting behavior of the
elected members of the United States House of
Representatives on the issue of national immigration.

This

work focuses on selected immigration roll call votes taken
during the 99th and 104th Congresses.

An examination of the

voting behavior of the 435 elected representatives from each
year will be examined, specifically 10 roll call votes taken
during their respective terms.

Introduction
The issue of immigration is one of the perennials in
the flower garden of the American body politic.

The issue

has come to the fore time and again, often resulting in much
discussion in Congress, the media, and the country as a
whole, but with very little, if any legislation issuing from
the discussions.

Yet, the 1980s and the 1990s have seen a

change from this previous pattern of behavior.

Congress,

regarding immigration as a domestic concern (Wildavsky
1969), has taken the lead in reshaping American immigration
law.

During the last two decades the Congress has passed,

and the sitting Presidents have signed into law, several
major immigration statutes.

These laws have been passed as

a result of the growing strength of those who argue that
immigration, as a whole, has a negative effect on the United
States - not just economically, but socially and politically
as well.

Those who hold such a view argue that action must

be taken now to head off greater problems in the future
(Beck 1996; Brownfeld 1993; Dalton 1992; James 1991) . 1
Only four years after the immigration procedures of the
United States received a major overhaul, Congress, in 1990,
mandated the creation of the United States Commission on
Immigration Reform.

The mandate charged that commission to

report recommendations for changes to existing U.S.
immigration policy, and put forward proposals that would
shape the immigration policy of this country for the next
several decades (U.S. Commission Report 1995).

Although

having issued several interim reports, the final report of

The word conservative, as used in this study, is
generally used in reference to people who fall into this
category.
2

the commission is not due until later in this year.
Nonetheless, the 104th Congress has passed several far
reaching legislative measures, only some of which agree with
the recommendations put forward by the commission.

These

changes will have a great effect on future immigration, and
the manner in which immigrants are treated - regarding the
policies of both federal and state governments.
As mentioned, the main thrust of the reports so far
have been in line with the legislative actions taken; namely
a reduction in all levels of immigration, a reduction in the
quotas for various forms of immigrant visas issued, and a
reduction, and significantly smaller cap, in the waivers
issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
to individuals who would otherwise be ineligible for
immigration or subject to deportation (U.S. Commission
Report 1995).

However, the changes in entitlement programs,

and the exclusion of immigrants from such programs, not to
mention the changing status of many immigrants from South
America, that the 104th Congress has enacted, were not
included in any report from any body studying immigration.
In order to examine the voting behavior and attitudes
of the elected representatives in respect to immigration
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issues, votes from the 99th and 104th Congresses were
selected and examined.

The 1986 house voting selected was

taken on the 1986 Immigration and Reform Control Act, one of
the most sweeping reviews of immigration policy and
regulation to take place during the 1980s, and the greatest
changes in immigration policy, up to that point in time,
during the latter part of this century.

Some of the most

discussed issues included in the legislation were the
provisions which granted amnesty and legal status to
millions of illegal immigrants who were physically in the
United States at the time of the bill becoming law.
The selected votes used for 1996 were taken from the
voting on immigration issues and changes contained within
the omnibus bill which overhauled the immigration laws yet
again, and added several new provisions to immigration
regulations.

These new laws were some of the most

restrictive passed since the 924 National Origin Act.

The

various changes that these new laws introduced ranged from
restricting legal immigrants' access to federal and state
welfare programs, restricting the appeal rights of
immigrants by decisions of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, raising the fiscal requirements for
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immigrants to gain access to the country, and limiting the
number of immigrants from all areas of the world.
This study has been undertaken in order to examine the
stance of various representatives on the immigration issue,
and the related issues briefly discussed above, and consider
any group differences between parties, gender, races, ages,
and other given variables.

The selection of two congresses

ten years apart will allow examination of any changes over
the decade between the two Houses to also be discussed.
The statistical results provided from the data will
allow a ranking of the various representatives, individually
and by group variables, on a scale of one through ten as
regards their stance on the immigration issue.

A total of

eight hypotheses have been developed and they will be tested
using the results culled from the voting study.
The final data will allow several generalizations to be
made about the voting behavior of the members of the
respective congresses regarding to immigration.

The Issue - Immigration
Immigration has been a fact of life in American
politics since the inception of the nation itself.

5

America

was not even a generation old before the appearance of the
first anti-foreigner acts.

The Alien and Sedition Acts of

the late 18th Century were actually enforced and several
people were imprisoned before President Jefferson pardoned,
and apologized, on behalf of the nation to those individuals
prosecuted and convicted.

The history of the anti-Chinese,

anti-Irish, anti-Catholic, or even general anti-immigrant
laws are well recorded, and can be found in any history
text.

Many people would declare such days to be behind us,

and today to be a more modern, enlightened, accepting era.
However, there is still a stringent anti-immigrant
voice in America.

In 1992 the Inter University Consortium

of Political Science Research election study revealed that
almost 50% of the respondents were firmly in support of
further restricting, and reducing, the immigration flow to
this country.

In 1994 the National Election Study

questioned respondents on whether or not immigration to the
United States should be increased, remain constant, or be
decreased.

Only 5 percent supported an increase, with 29

percent arguing for current levels.

However, an

overwhelming 64 percent of those surveyed stated that
immigration to the United States should be decreased from
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its current levels.

Thus a gap of two years saw a

significant increase in support for decreased immigration.
Representative Dana Rohrabacher of California stated that
"If you love everybody, you love nobody.
bottom line.

And that's the

And we've got to love our own people first"

(Isbister 1996, 209).

Porter Goss, a representative from

Florida said that "We are strained at the seams taking care
of those we have"

(House Subcommittee on Immigration and

Claims Print 1995, 29) He went on to say that the nation had
finite resources and that this meant that immigration should
be more firmly controlled.
The discussion of the various members of the House over
the immigration issue has been critical of many of the ideas
advanced - and critics have crossed party lines.

Although

the vast majority of the new, stricter immigration controls
have been advanced by Republican party members, some
Republicans have been heated in their opposition to some of
their fellow representatives' ideas.

Republican Sam

Brownback, a Kansas representative, and Richard Chrysler, of
Michigan, have joined with Howard Berman of California in
opposing any cuts to legal immigration, and have strongly
lobbied the GOP caucus for support from their fellow

7

Republicans (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report V54:12).
However, Democrats Anthony Beilenson of California, and John
Bryant of Texas, strongly supported the immigration bills
that stood before the 104th Congress, especially the bill
limiting the size of overall immigration.

Indeed, Bryant

co-sponsored HR2202, saying legal immigration could not be
ignored (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report V54:12).
These provisions eventually became law in the shape of PL
104-208, and the reaction to this bill has caused some
Republican representatives to become very wary of how their
party is viewed on the immigration issue (Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report V55:20).

Peter Long, a House

Republican from New York stated "The Republican Party is
going to needlessly run the risk of antagonizing immigrant
voters ... " (Congressional Quarterly 'Weekly Report V55:20).
The media has also taken on a most strident voice
regarding immigrants, as they addressed the recent issue of
"foreign influence" in fund raising by the Democratic and
Republican party.

Such reporting, often taken from both

extremes of the immigration argument has caused a backlash
in party behavior.

In fact, the Democratic party has

announced that it will no longer accept money from resident
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aliens - a perfectly legal and long accepted practice
(Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report V54:49).

Such a move

can only be considered to be a knee jerk reaction to bad
press.

The media has long been a public forum for

supporters of all sides of the immigration issue.

Sara

Diamond, a sociologist from California, is regularly
published attacking the right wing "nativist bigots" and
anti-immigrant activists"

(Leone 1994). Diamond claims that

these elements, and groups such as FAIR (Federation for
American Immigration Reform) and AICF (American Immigration
Control Foundation), perpetuate the worst aspects of
American culture.

Also, the Los Angeles Times has long

supported, through the use of editorials and guest
columnists, the immigration cause, and immigrants
themselves.

Through articles by such people as Sergios

Munoz, member of a think tank for Southwest issues, the
paper presents pro-immigration arguments and questions
statements by politicians who argue against immigration
(Leone 1994).

However. the same newspaper has carried

stories that present immigration in a serious light, such as
"Chinese Refugees Take to High Seas"
March 16, 1993).
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(Los Angeles Times,

Also, the

several pieces of immigration legislation

that have been enacted during the last two years have been
described in the popular press as "draconian" in nature, if
not downright anti-foreigner.

It is now illegal for a legal

immigrant to obtain numerous forms of federal assistance,
including such things as Food Stamps, Medicaid, Medicare and
Supplementary Social Security.

However, any income they

make is still directly taxed for such purposes.

The same

time period has also seen the passage of a law which limits
the immigration quota, and another which eliminates the
right of immigrants to appeal decisions of the INS to the
federal court system (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report
V54:12).

Yet, Congressional Quarterly also reports that the

last few years have seen a major rise in the number of
registered voters from recent immigrant groups, and also a
rise in the number of new citizens - new citizens who have
been actively encouraged to register to vote - the number of
one million naturalized citizens in 1996, is expected to
double to 2 million in 1997 (Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report V55:20).
The new "anti-immigration stance that many Americans
seem to affect has also given rise to several new
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publications addressing the issue.

John Isbister, who

describes himself as a defender of immigration, argues that
the changes that are wrought by the current levels (meaning
the pre 1996 legislation levels) of immigration are both far
reaching and desirable (Isbister 1996).

Yet, he also

acknowledges that Americans are threatened by immigration that they always have been, and probably always will be.
For example, Negative Population Growth, Inc., a
social/political anti-immigration agency, has carried large
advertisements in major periodicals proclaiming "Because we
have allowed our nation to become seriously overpopulated we
are in deep trouble ... we must halt illegal immigration and
sharply reduce legal immigration" (Isbister 1996, 121).
Such a view is also supported by others, who argue that
immigration has put a serious strain on American security,
social services and native U.S. workers (Brownfeld 1993;
Harrison 1992; James 1991).
Beck (1996) provides several arguments against
immigration, and also many in favor of sharply reduced
immigration levels.

He argues that the actions of Congress

during the 1960s unleashed what he called the "harshest"
wave of immigration yet.

He further argues that the
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American people have been seeking, for several years, lower
immigration levels and have finally found a responsive
federal government (Beck 1996) .

It is very interesting to

note that Beck provides a foreword to his book in which he
addresses his reasons and motives for writing his work.

He

disclaims the label "nativist" and even argues that he is
pro-immigrant because reduced immigration would also help
recent immigrants, who "suffer" most from the economic
effect of increased or further immigration.
The new legislative actions of 1996 have taken place a
mere ten years after one of the most sweeping overhauls of
the nations' immigration laws.

Although the bill initiated

criminal, rather than just civil, penalties for immigration
violations, it also granted amnesty and pardon to several
million illegal immigrants.

This amnesty allowed many to

become citizens, after obtaining legal status, and also
enhanced their ability to obtain immigrant visas for their
family members still abroad. Yet, one decade later the tide
has reversed and both legal, as well as the illegal
immigrants, have become the target of new, much stricter
laws.

Immigration has once again come to the fore as a

12

campaign issue in local, state and federal elections, in
such states as California, Florida, and New York.
There are many questions about the issue of immigration
and the immigration debate, as well as many popularly held
hypotheses about immigration.
not?

Who supports it; who does

Is it an issue throughout the United States, or only

in some states?

Do clear distinctions exist between people

of differing age, ethnicity, party identification, and
region?

Are these differences reflected in the voting

behavior of the elected representatives of such groups?
This roll call analysis of the voting behavior of the 99th
and 104th House of Representatives will, by testing eight
hypotheses, search for and identify any differences.
Furthermore, the changes in the tone of the debate on the
immigration issue over the last ten years will also be
tested by a temporal comparison of the data for each House.
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Chapter Two
Development of Roll Call Analysis and Vote Studies

Roll Calls - Critique and Validity Studies
The literature which exists on roll call analyses and
studies is wide and varied.

If an individual so chose, he

or she could go back to the pre-war years in an attempt to
fully review the subject.

However, I began my study of

relevant materials with MacRae's statistical study of the
81st Congress (1958) .

MacRae provides a discussion on how

to conduct a roll call analysis.

Although many of his

points have been superseded by time and structural changes,
his scale analysis, and his observation of those factors
which influence voting behavior, remain quite valid.

MacRae

states that the roll call votes, and any statistical study
thereof are just the final end result of a variety of
influences.

These influences include such items as the

attitude of the representative and the policy situation
applicable to the vote (MacRae 1958).

This latter point was

later reiterated by Mathews and Stimson (1975) .

MacRae

strongly warns that any position(s) inferred from roll call
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analysis do not necessarily indicate the attitudes of
members of Congress, or the pressure a member is receiving
from the constituency.

Nor is MacRae alone in this

assertion (Kingdon 1992).

Both argue that positions and

votes are the end result of such aforementioned influences,
plus the influence of a number of other, like related
factors.

These factors include pressure from such sources

as interest

groups, cues from fellow legislators, pressure

from the party organization, or the current administration,
(MacRae 1958)

(Kingdon 1992) and any relevant audiences with

whom the member may be in contact (MacRae 1958).

Two other

important factors that enter the decision-making process,
and must be considered in any analysis of votes to pass a
bill are an understanding of the content of a bill (Clausen
1973) and compromise (Enelow 1984).
The MacRae study was one of a number which took place
in the early post-war years.

Many of these studies were

critiqued by Wilder Crane in his A Caveat on Roll-Call
Studies of Party Voting (1960) .

Crane examined the use of

roll call studies in order to specifically test the measure
of importance of party in legislative actions.

His study

did not examine the U.S. Congress. He used roll call results
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and a series of personal interviews with members of the 1957
Wisconsin Legislature.

Crane bemoaned the fact that such a

study could not be conducted at the national level due to
the limited number of roll call votes taken during any one
session.

However, due to many of the reforms and behavioral

changes that have taken place in Congress during the last
few decades this is no longer an issue when studying
Congress (Kingdon 1992; Weisberg 1978).
Crane challenged a number of assumptions of the time by
questioning the argument that party was the most important
factor when it came to voting.

He questioned whether or not

legislators were voting to uphold party position, or whether
they were actually responding to other, broader factors
(Crane 1960) .

Crane used a Rice Cohesion Index of Party

Likeness (IPL) in voting, and directly compared the results
of that to partisan statements taken from personal
interviews.

He concluded that there was in fact not

necessarily a correlation between roll call vote results and
the actual degree of party pressure applied upon individual
legislators.
Crane further concluded that a high IPL did not reveal
to what extent the party was actually a factor.
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He also

concluded that a low IPL could suggest factors of a partisan
nature when none may well be present.

Finally he rejected

two widely held scholarly assertions.

First, party loyalty

could not be measured simply by how a majority of the party
votes, and secondly party loyalty is not a constant factor
in voting behavior (Crane 1960).
In a direct response to Crane, two authors critiqued
his work and concluded that Crane's discussion had several
statistical and conceptual problems that weakened his
argument considerably (Greenstein and Jackson 1963).

It was

argued that Crane's IPL was (in direct contrast to Crane's
interpretation) a valid measure of party influence in the
roll call study.

Furthermore, the roll call cases used for

measurement were criticized as being unrepresentative as a
sample (Greenstein and Jackson, 1963).

The conception and

measurement scales were also refuted as being inadequate.
Greenstein and Jackson argued that Crane's partisan
measurement statistic was an inadequate index of party
influence and that his overall conclusions about party
influence, or lack thereof, were very much suspect.
Another work also reviewed the major theories of roll
call voting fifteen years later. Weisberg (1978) considered
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the major philosophical issue involved, setting criteria for
evaluation of theories of roll call analysis and he
developed several baseline models against which he could
measure those theories that he revised.

Weisberg evaluated

the theories against his criteria, and in light of the
results he discussed how a legislative model of voting
behavior should be constructed.
Weisberg concluded that even with a minimal amount of
information (usually just party affiliation) the prediction
level of any roll call study is fairly high, and he further
stated that each of the theories that he reviewed provided
little improvement beyond that point.

He provides that time

and time again the best predictor of votes in the U.S. House
of Representatives is the party affiliation of the
legislator in question.

Weisberg argues that with that

statistic alone it is possible to correctly predict, on
average, 82.4 percent of the votes.

Therefore, he concludes

that a model or theory with an 88 percent predictive rate
success (which several of those he critiqued claimed) cannot
be considered validated (Weisberg 1978).
However, Weisberg's and Greenstein and Jackson's
conclusion that party is the major factor in influencing
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voting behavior is opposed.

There are may scholars who

argue that party is not the sole, nor the major influence of
a congressional vote.

Many hold that the influences include

party, but also include other factors.

These factors are:

influence of pressure groups, the Administration, members of
the constituency, state delegations, other legislators, and
several other factors

(Clausen 1973; Jackson 1974; Jackson

and King 1989; Kingdon 1992; MacRae 1958; Mathews and
Stimson 1975; Shannon 1968).

Influencing Factors - Party Versus Others
This issue of party, and its importance on voting, as
compared to other factors, has been a much debated one, as
has been the issue of the importance of constituency.

Fenno

has directly approached the issue - using a different method
than roll call studies (Fenno 1978). He observed the
behavior of 18 representatives of the U.S. House by spending
time with them in their districts.

He argued that the

results of this study were important in that it would
provide an insight into how the representatives perceived
their respective constituencies.

Recognizing that most

research on the views of national legislators takes place in
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Washington, Fenno argued that it is while in their districts
that the relationships between the legislator and
constituents are "· .. created, nurtured, and formed"

(Fenno

1978, xiii).
Fenno stated that each representative can view their
constituency in four distinct ways.

He labels these views

as being geographic, re-election, primary, or personal in
nature.

Fenno concludes that each of these views, and how

the representatives view them in importance, can have a
direct effect on the recorded voting behavior of those
representatives.

Thus, Fenno argues that constituency is a

major influence in voting behavior.
The interview style was also employed for another
examination in the voting decisions of members of Congress
(Kingdon 1992).

Kingdon interviewed a group which he called

a "cross sectional" sample of members of Congress.

He

concluded that there were a variety of factors which
affected the voting behavior of legislators and that
constituencies were very important.

However, Kingdon

pointed out that constituencies were comprised of several
elements.

Among these elements were active and attentive

elites, and in order to avoid any major problems with "the
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folks back home" members usually ensure that their stated or
voted position is not contrary to constituency wishes.

Or,

to be more specific, contrary to the wishes of the active,
or the attentive elites (Kingdon 1992) .
Kingdon further argued that political parties, and the
inter party (and intra-party) differences also have an
impact on legislative behavior.

This clearly points to the

importance of ideology in voting behavior, as well as a
distinct overlap between the factors of ideology and party.
There is also an overlap between the issue of party,
constituency, ideology and pressure from the sitting
Administration.

Kingdon states that the stance of the

Administration is important because partisan constituents
are usually aware of the position of the Administration and
the legislator and that problems can arise if there is a
difference between the two (Kingdon 1992)
Also, Kingdon examined the influence of interest
groups.

Indeed, he stated that in this age of ever

increasing election costs the ability of Political Action
Committees to channel money to candidates means that the
importance of interest groups is a great factor in decision
making.

21

Economic Models
Political scientists are not the only scholars who have
sought to understand the influences on legislative voting
behavior.

Although pursued with different objectives in

mind, economists, or political scientists with an economic
issue in mind, have also created models to explain
legislative behavior.
Jackson and King (1989) created a model of
legislative behavior by addressing the 1978 Tax Reform Act.
One of the main topics within their work was the issue of
how representatives are influenced in their voting behavior.
Using votes taken from various actions on the 1878 Tax
Reform Act to test a model of representatives roll call
voting, they found that constituent preferences (mainly
about income redistribution) played a large part in how
legislators voted.

Jackson and King stated that the vote of

any individual legislator could be roughly measured in
mathematical terms as; personal preference of the
representative, plus the demands of the party, plus the
preferences of constituents multiplied by any factors
related to constituent influence.
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The authors also listed several related factors.

These

included the electoral margin, the sophistication of the
electorate, homogeneity (or lack of) in the district, and
the seniority of the member.

Jackson and King also noted a

much greater degree of party voting from the Republican
representatives, while at the same time noting the
Democratic representatives exhibited a pattern of better
representing constituent preferences (Jackson and King
1989) .
Another study done from an economic standpoint was
conducted by Kau and Rubin (1993).

They approached roll

call voting in an attempt to explain the passage of certain
forms of regulatory legislation.

While recognizing that

they, as economists, would address problems differently from
the manner of political scientists, Kau and Rubin argue that
two main hypotheses exist for the passage of such laws.
First, laws may be passed to benefit various special
interest groups, or secondly laws may be passed for
ideological reasons.

Kau and Rubin state that these two

hypothesis are not inconsistent with one another.
The authors present a model based on the idea that
there is a connection between the voting behavior of

23

representatives, the representatives' constituents, and
donors to the representatives campaigns (Kau and Rubin
1993).

Thus, there is agreement with the ideas put forward

on constituency importance (Fenno 1978) and donor money
(Kingdon 19 92) .

Roll Call Studies - Recommended Guidelines and Requirements
Most scholars who have reviewed roll call studies, or
presented models for discussion have included several
requirements and guidelines for any future undertakings.
Crane (1960) argued that any roll call study attempted,
whatever the subject, had one major "pre-condition" knowledge of the specific bills in question. Greenstein and
Jackson (1963) provided several concluding statements for
those who would engage in further study.

First they

provided that any future attempts to conceptualize roll call
voting should employ a "refined conceptualization" of the
influence of party voting.

In other words, they wished to

see party voting explained in terms both deeper and more
scientifically testable than Crane's.

Second, they argued

that any roll call analysis should allow for random
selection from a range of different populations - different
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legislatures at different times.

Thus, any validation

measurements can be tested beyond a limited time
sample/selection. Furthermore, they argued that any studies
should take into account, over everything else, the
"complexity" of the particular phenomenon which is under
analysis.

This is more than just an echo of Crane's demand

of knowledge of specific bills, Greenstein and Jackson are
obviously requesting a deep understanding of all factors
relating to the area of study.
Mathews and Stimson (1975) state that there are major
limitations which should be addressed in any study.

First,

roll calls focus on the final decision - the floor vote and this should be clearly considered and stated, a fact
noted by others (MacRae, 1958).

An examination of causal

factors is necessary for any model that claims to provide
answers.

Therefore any model, or roll call analysis, must

discuss and address the phenomena which occurs early in the
process of decision making.

Also, the authors state that

the decision strategies of individual legislators are formed
throughout their whole career.

Thus some events that have

an effect on how an individual votes on any given issue can
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take place a long time before the vote in question.

(Mathews

and Stimson 1975) .
Weisberg also provided a section on how to construct a
model of legislative behavior.

He argues that any theory

that is to be presented should include both long and short
term elements, but should clearly distinguish between both.
He also strongly argues that verisimilitude is necessary for
any model that purports to explain how the house majority,
or party majority, is so successfully predictive (Weisberg
1978) .

Conclusions And Questions
This review of the various critiques, models and studies
provides several conclusions and issues.

Perhaps the most

important issue to be addressed from the above is that of
Greenstein and Jackson and Weisberg.

They suggest that roll

call studies are either impossible to carry out, or unworthy
of the time invested in them due to the overwhelming
influence and importance of party affiliation.

However, in

reply I would employ not only the statements of the several
other authors included but also of Greenstein and Jackson
themselves.

Their argument has not lost any lustre over the
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last thirty years.

They argue that any roll call study

should employ a more refined conceptualization of the
influence of party voting.
the problem:
voting.

I argue that this is the crux of

How to measure, and conceptualize party

What exactly is part of the factor which is party

voting, and what is part of another close, but separate
factor - such as ideology, cue taking, constituency, etc?
Is the study of party actually the study of ideology, or the
study of constituency?
Shannon (1968) addressed this very point.
major questions:

He asked two

One, do constituency factors account for

inter-party differences (read ideology), and two, are
parties different because constituencies are different (read
constituency)?

In his answer to these questions Shannon

stated that in any roll call analysis the influence of party
and constituency cannot be completely separated.

The

differences in the constituency base of the parties (for
Shannon stated that the constituencies that elect the
different parties are different) lead to the differences in
the voting behavior of the representatives (Shannon 1968) .
Therefore, if the constituency bases are different and elect
different people the ideology of the constituency must have
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a basis in selecting the ideology of the representative,
which is shown in that individuals' voting record.
(1992) agrees with this statement.

Kingdon

While he admits that

most studies point to the central importance of party, party
voting may well be a function, or combined function, of
other factors.

These factors include, but are not limited

to; constituency, coalitions, party leadership requests,
party leadership demands, cue taking, etc.
Also, in recent years a number of representatives, and
not a few senators have switched parties.

They have done so

claiming that the ideology they have is not shared by the
party which they have just left.

Yet, with a quick review

of the voting records in the Congressional Quarterly
Almanacs, their party loyalty vote before the changeovers
took place did not seem so significantly different in most
cases to cause comment - it did not set them apart from
their peers.

A closer study of these "switchers" and their

party voting (both before and after the action) could prove
interesting.
In conclusion, therefore, it would seem that Weisberg
is highlighting the wrong issue.

It is not that party

voting is such a high predictor of roll call voting - it is
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just that the need of Greenstein and Jackson - a more
refined conceptualization of party voting - remains unmet.
Or, it may well be that Kingdon is correct and the factors
work in a combined fashion that we are unable to separate.
So, the model for voting behavior remains unclear in
its makeup.

Weisberg (1978) says party is enough, and

Greenstein and Jackson (1963) seem to reservedly agree with
him.

Crane (1960) argues that a knowledge of bills is a

must, and that other broader factors also come into play.
Jackson and King (1989) provide a model that includes the
demands of the party, but these demands constitute only a
major third of the whole equation.

The other two major

parts being personal preference, which overlaps with Kau and
Rubin's ideology argument (1993) and the constituency, and
the influence that that constituency has with the legislator
(Fenno 1978) .
Whatever the influence on a given representatives'
actions and votes, this study will not attempt to fully
define them.

The stated purpose, a study of immigration

voting behavior, will allow us to examine which groups and
individuals vote in which manner.

It will give us an

insight into certain common characteristics that such groups
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possess.

It will answer in relative comparison - what is

the immigration ideology of the Republican/Democratic
parties, what is the party voting stance on immigration
issue, and when do legislators follow party and when do they
not on immigration issues?
part, a model.

Therefore, this study is, in

It is a model that is incomplete in that it

will not allow us to predict behavior on immigration voting.
Nor will I be examining all the variables, or how such
variables would interact.

But this study will provide

insight into immigration voting behavior and representatives
views on immigration.

30

Chapter Three
Methodology and Hypotheses

In order to achieve the research focus of this study,
as previously mentioned, the major immigration bills of 1986
and 1996 were chosen for study, with ten house floor votes
being selected as the roll call votes for study in each data
set.

All of the 435 elected representatives were included

in the study.
disregarded.

The non-voting delegates to Congress were
Although both years include major legislative

action on immigration, they were specifically chosen due to
their contrasting nature.

In 1986 the House was firmly

under the control of the Democratic party (and, of course,
had been for some time) and the White House was Republican.
However, the 104th Congress in 1996 was under the control of
the Republican party, which also held a reasonable majority,
and the White House was Democratic.
The votes selected for the data set 2 were chosen from
all the votes related to the passage of the bill 3 •

In 1986

2

For a description of each of the selected votes, please
see Appendix A.
3

It should be noted that the selected votes were chosen
by the author to represent a cross section of immigration voting
in each particular session of congress. The choice was a
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all but two of the subject votes were substantive in nature
- the remaining two being votes on procedural motions.
1996 only one of the votes was a procedural motion.

In

In all

other nine cases the votes were to pass, or strike,
amendments, or to pass the bill, or conference report,
itself.

The number of votes represents no significance

beyond the fact that by choosing ten from each year I could
present the research in a hospitable mathematical form.
All representatives who registered a score for all ten
votes have received a final overall score between zero and
ten.

Thus, the higher the score for a representative, the

more restrictive that representative is considered on
immigration issues.

Any Representatives who did not record

a vote (or stance) on one of the votes did not receive a
final overall score, nor are they included in the
statistical analyses in this work.
Each vote was considered on its individual merits and
given a stance of either Favor Immigrant, or Not Favor
Immigrant.

Depending upon the manner of the vote, and the

direction in which each representative voted in regards to
that particular vote, every representative

was given a

subjective one on the author's part, and others may have chosen
different votes for different reasons.
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score of one or zero.

A score of one (1) indicated that in

that particular vote the representative had taken a Not
Favor Immigrant stance.

A score of zero (0) indicated that

the representative had taken a Favor Immigrant stance.

Any

representative who had no actual recorded vote, but who
publicly announced for or against the vote in question, was
provided a value in keeping with the announced position.
Therefore, the actual vote count, as recorded in the House,
and the vote count as recorded in the data set may not match
in all circumstances. 4
All the information pertaining to the votes of
representatives, or their announced positions, was drawn
from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac for 1986, or the
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report for March 23, 1996,
and September 28, 1996.
Each individual representative was also coded for five
separate variables; state, party, sex, race, and age.

Where

a seat changed hands, or was vacant during the period

4

The author wishes to note here that each of the
decisions on labelling the votes either Favor, or Not Favor,
could be considered subjective. The decision was based upon the
sole assessment of the author and it could well be that other
students or scholars of political science would choose to
interpret the information in a slightly different manner.
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studied, the last three variables were not recorded5 •

The

age variable consisted of placing each representative in
one of five categories 6 •

Membership of each group was

decided by the age of the representative at the start of
that congressional term - not at the time the vote was
recorded; it was surmised that very few representatives had
birthdays which would cause them to change to a higher
group.

In the case of party for Bernie Sanders, the

independent representative from Vermont, he was coded as a
Democrat.

This decision was taken in light of the fact that

in all the recorded votes he voted with a majority of the
Democratic party all but once, and in that singular case he
voted with a sizable minority of said party.
Certain variables that could be considered to be
important factors affecting the voting behavior of a
representative were considered but not used.

First, the

nature of a representative's constituency, whether it could

5

In the 1986 data set, there were two seats that fell
into this category.
In the 1996 data set there were four seats.
6

This five set range was set up in the following manner;
Group One consisted of representatives under the age of 34,
Group Two was made up of thirty five to forty four year olds,
Group Three was forty five to fifty four year olds, Group Four
was fifty five to sixty four year olds, and Group Five was for
those sixty five and over.
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be classified as urban, suburban, or rural, was not used.
This decision was taken for one major reason.

Namely, the

difficulty in coding each constituency in such a manner.
Several constituencies crossed the definitions of more than
one style, some even encompassing all such regions especially in the case of the less populated states.
Secondly, the ethnic/racial/immigrant population of the
constituency was not considered.

This was due to the

difficulty in conceptualizing such a variable.

While the

government does provide census data that records the
national or ethnic backgrounds of percentages of the
population within each congressional district, there is no
indication of how many generations those individuals
families have resided in the United States.

Indeed,

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report states that
immigration groups argue that immigrants who are used in
such studies tend to be those who have been in the United
States for some time, as newer immigrants tend to be less
comfortable with the use of English, or with answering
questions for pollsters (Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report 55:20). Thus, any attempt to gauge the immigrant
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population, or recent immigrant population of
representatives constituencies was not undertaken.
Lastly, the electoral margin of victory in the previous
House election was not considered.

This decision was taken

due to the large number of resignations, primary losers, and
vacancies that had preceded the 104th congress.

This would

have meant a significantly smaller number of variables from
the second data set to be examined and compared to the first
data set.
The data set will be utilized to subject the hypotheses
to testing by the use of cross tabulations and T-Tests.
Each separate hypothesis will be tested individually for
each year, and then the last hypothesis will be an
examination of the changes that have taken place between the
99th and 104th Congress.

Formulation And Statement of Hypotheses
Eight hypotheses were formulated so that two tasks
could be undertaken.

In the first place the data could be

utilized to empirically test each individual hypothesis in
regards to certain opinions and stances on immigration
issues.

Secondly I could examine how certain
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representatives would vote on immigration issues, either
individually or in groups.
The hypotheses were formulated using a number of widely
held assumptions.

Given the Republican party's more

conservative stance on social issues in general, and
immigration in particular, plus the actions of certain
recent congressional Republicans (such as Henry Hyde, author
of the restrictions on deportation appeals and welfare
restrictions), it seemed that the Democrats were more
immigrant "friendly" than the Republicans. This gave rise to
hypothesis one which states - Republican Representatives
favor more restrictive immigration laws than do Democratic
Representatives.
Hypothesis two was formulated in light of the fact that
the conservative alliance is a studied phenomena, and that
the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, and the
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, provide the votes for the
Democratic party as a whole, and subdivided into northern
and southern states.

Also, the more conservative slant of

the southern populace towards immigration, and the influx of
new immigrants should be reflected in the voting of their
representatives.

Hypothesis two states - Southern Democrats
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will tend to favor more restrictive immigration laws than
northern Democrats.
The third hypothesis was formulated with the existence
of groups such as America for Americans (based in
California) , Arizonians for English (a group supporting the
English language as the official U.S. language, active at
both the national and state level) , and the other groups
discussed in Chapter One, such as the AICF, or the
Federation for Immigration Reform.

Also, the actions and

comments of politicians from states such as California, New
York, and Arizona seem to show a polarization of the issue
in those states where immigration is more widespread, and
discussed.

Hypothesis three states - Representatives from

the immigrant heavy states will tend to favor more
restrictive immigration laws than Representatives from
states where immigration is not so prevalent, or such a
salient issue.
Hypothesis four takes into account the arguments that
women are supposedly more socially accepting than men.

In

support of this is the documented evidence of the gender gap
- more female support for Democrat than Republican
candidates.

It has been argued that the gender gap exists
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due to the fact that women are more nurturing and
compassionate than men (Erikson and Tedin 1995) . Hypothesis
Four states - Female Representatives tend to favor less
restrictive immigration laws than do male Representatives.
Hypothesis five was formulated in order to test the
idea that most minority groups would be supportive of
policies that benefit like groups.

Consider the existence

of the Rainbow Coalition, which was specifically formed to
create a united front among minorities.

Also, the electoral

support of many minority legislators is made up of recent
immigrants or their relatives.

Hypothesis five states -

Minority Representatives will tend to favor less restrictive
immigration laws than do non-minority Representatives.
The next hypothesis, number six, is almost an outgrowth
of study into number five.
IL) is a good example.

The reputation of Gus Savage (D-

An African-American legislator he

was of ten accused of being most unfriendly towards other
ethnic groups, especially Asians and Sino-Asians.

Indeed,

the Rainbow Coalition was formed in an attempt to heal
certain rifts between the minority groups and present a
united front. Therefore, it was surmised that perhaps there
could be a significant difference between the voting records
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of various minority groups.

Hypothesis six states -

Hispanic representatives will tend to favor less restrictive
immigration laws than do African-American Representatives. 7
Hypothesis seven was formulated with ideas that reflect
some of the same ideas as hypothesis two.

A distinction

between the generations in the political parties has been
documented - older Democrats have often been considered more
socially conservative than their younger colleagues. Many
younger Republicans, especially the freshman class of '94
have often been referred to has more ideologically right
wing than more senior members of the Republican caucus.
Hypothesis seven states - Younger non-minority Democrats
will tend to favor less restrictive immigration policies
than do older non-minority democrats.

Younger, non-minority

Republicans will tend to favor more restrictive immigration
than do older, non-minority Republicans.
Hypothesis eight reflects the temporal differences that
are expected to be found in the data.

Given the language

and nature of the 1986 legislation, and the more
conservative language and nature of the 1996 legislation, a
7

The presence of other minorities in Congress is far too
small to allow an investigation of other minority groups.
The
data set confirmed the presence of only a handful of minority
members outside of Hispanics and African-Americans.
40

discernable movement is expected in the average scores, and
the scores of the previous seven hypotheses.

Hypothesis

eight states - The data from the 99th Congress and the data
from the 104th Congress will show a shift towards a more
restrictive view of immigration in the House of
Representatives at all levels, and within all groups.

Subject Legislation
Immigration and Reform Control Act of 1986
The 1986 bill, finally signed into law as PL 99-603 by
President Ronald Reagan, was the second attempt in a row to
alter the existing national immigration laws.

The previous

Congress had passed similar legislation but had been unable
to agree on a conference report and it had died with the end
of the second session.
The same path had seemed to be in line for House
proposal HR 3810 in the 99th Congress.

On September 26,

1986, the House rejected a rule limiting floor amendments to
the bill, a touchy issue as the subject of farm worker
related provisions had been hotly debated.

However, with a

modified amendment on that issue the bill came back to the
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House on October 9, and although hotly debated once again,
was finally passed by a clear margin of 230-166
The issue of the farm workers provisions, submitted by
Charles Schumer (D-NY), was considered to be the booster
that allowed the bill to pass with such strong support (a
similar bill in 1984 had scrapped by with only 5 votes to
spare).

The major difference was that while in 1984, 138

Democrats had voted against immigration changes, arguing
that migrant workers could be exploited under the proposed
rules, in 1986 only 61 voted in such manner.
California, where immigration has been, and still
remains, a very important issue, the change in the
Democratic party was reflected in the Democratic caucus of
that state with an almost exact numerical turn around from
opposition to support by half of the members between 1984
and 1986.
The Senate had already passed an immigration bill, and
after a successful conference between the chambers, the
conference report was adopted by the House on October 15,
1986, with the Senate following suit two days later.
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HR 2202 - 1996 Immigration Bill (HR 3610)
Unlike the 1986 bill this legislation received much
less overall bipartisan support. with one major exception attacking legal, as well as illegal immigrant.

Indeed,

there was much debate, in the House, and among interested
parties about the very nature of including restrictions on
both illegal and legal immigrants in the same bill.

On

March 21, 1996 the House voted to remove most of the
restrictions on legal immigration from the bill.

The main

author of the bill was Lamar Smith (R-TX) , Chair of the
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, who claimed
disappointment at the removal of further legal restrictions
on immigration.

However, his bill, which would have

restricted the number of overall visas especially in the
field of reunification (where family members are reunited in
America) was lobbied against by several Republican freshmen,
including Chrysler of Michigan and Brownback of Kansas.
Like many members of the House, they sought to distinguish
between legals and illegals.

However, there was some

Democratic support for limiting legal immigration,
especially from those members from the front line state of
California.

Anthony C. Beilenson (D-CA) was fully in
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support of Smith's bill, arguing that communities were
becoming overwhelmed by the "burden" of providing various
social services to new immigrants.
However, in its final form, the legislation does affect
both legal and illegal immigrants.

On the legal side there

are now several restrictions forbidding aliens from
receiving public assistance up to ten years after they enter
the country.

A pilot telephone system for checking of

documented aliens has been set up in the five states with
the largest immigrant population.

Deportation of both legal

and illegal immigrants is now much easier, with harsher
penalties for those individuals who enter illegally or
overstay their legal welcome.

One of the most heated

provisions within the bill was sponsored by House Republican
Gallegly of California.

His amendment would allow states to

bar illegal immigrants of school age or children of illegal
immigrants (who are illegal themselves) from attending
school - from kindergarten through 12th grades.

These

provisions were supported, but removed from the bill after
the threat of a presidential veto.

They were later passed

in the House as separate legislation.

The final passage of

the legislation into law took place as part of HR 3610, the
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Omnibus Spending Bill, which the House passed 370-37 on
September 29, 1996.

Already passed by the Senate, President

Clinton signed HR 3610 into law on September 30, 1996.
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Chapter Four
Results from 1986 and 1996

Analysis of 1986 Data Set
The 1986 data set proved to be very complete with
respect to the personal variables of the House members, with
only half of one percent of the individual representatives
information being absent.
immediate striking results

However, one of the most
was that 79 Representatives had

incomplete voting records on all 10 recorded votes.

This

means an overall average absentee rate of just over 18
percent.
Also, the data set provided an excellent view of the
average United States Representative of 1986.

Obviously,

the Democratic party held an overwhelming majority in the
House, a pattern that would remain unbroken for another
eight years. The ethnic groupings also saw a heavy slant in
favor of white, non Hispanics, with 93.6 percent of the
House members being in that category.

The next largest

identified ethnic group were African-American legislators,
who numbered 19.

The other two identified ethnic groups,

Asians, and Hispanics, consisted of two and five members,
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respectively.

Two members of the House were unidentified in

terms of ethnicity/race.
In the gender group there was also a rather large
disparity between the subgroups - with males making up 95.2
percent of the House membership.

This statistic is very

much out of sync with the overall makeup of the American
population.
The one variable that showed a much more diverse result
was age.

Here the result provided an almost classic bell

curve result, with the largest group being within the ages
of 45 to 54.

The smallest age group being those

Representatives under the age of 34 - this group was only
2.8 percent of the total House.

It is interesting to note

that those Representatives over retirement age (65) were
better represented, with 11 percent of the House falling
into this category.
With almost 82 percent of the House receiving an
overall Favor/Not Favor Immigrant score the results provided
several noteworthy statements.

There was no large

collection at either end of the scale.

Instead, the results

showed two small groups, spread over several values,
clustered at both ends of the total vote graph
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(See Table

7) .

Only three Representatives scored a perfect zero (total

Favor Immigrant support) and only two Representatives scored
a perfect 10 (total Not Favor Immigrant support) .
Also, 41.4 percent of Representatives fell under the
five point level, showing quite a large Favor Immigrant
group.

On the other hand, only 31.4 percent scored above

five; the vast majority of this group actually scoring eight
or less.

Thus, the 99th Congress seems, overall, to lean

more in the direction of favoring immigrants than in passing
more restrictive immigration.

Indeed, there seems to be an

absence of any major identifiable anti-immigrant coalition
in the 99th Congress.

A closer analysis of each hypothesis

will prove or disprove this statement more closely.

Hypothesis One (Table 1)
This examination of party differences supported the
hypothesis.

The Democratic Representatives scored a mean of

3.55 on the scale, with a deviation of 2.03.

However, the

Republican score was 6.29 - a full 2.74 points higher.

The

Republican and Democratic deviation were almost exactly
alike, the Republicans recording a level of 2.09.
therefore, it can be stated that the Republican
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In 1986

Representatives do favor more restrictive immigration laws
than their Democratic counterparts.

Hypothesis Two (Table 3)
The southern elements of the Democratic party have long
been regarded as being more conservative than their fellow
party members to the north.

In this examination of the

voting behavior of these two groups in 1986 a clear
difference did emerge.

In the 99th Congress Democrats from

the Southern States 8 recorded a mean score of 4.82, almost
two full points higher than their northern counterparts
score of 2.99.

There was greater deviation within the

Southern Democrats group, 2.13, than the Northern Democrats,
1.72.

Therefore, in 1986 there was a distinct intra-party

difference within the Democratic party when geography is
taken into account.

Indeed, the Democrats from the Southern

states fall into the area between their own fellow party
members from the other states, and the Republicans.

The

difference between the Republican mean and the Southern

8

The Southern States are those classified as such within
the Congressional Quarterly Almanac voting record: Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia.
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Democratic mean is actually smaller than the gap between the
Democrats of the South and the rest of their party.

The

existence of a southern conservative group, at least in
relation to immigration issues, in 1986 is fully supported
by these results.

The clear difference that exists between

the two groups of Democrats is one of an obviously more
socially conservative nature, with Southern Democrats being
more in favor of restrictive immigration laws and policies.

Hypothesis Three (Table 3)
Bearing in mind the oft quoted phrase, "All politics is
local" the hypothesis that more restrictive immigration laws
would be supported in the areas where immigrants are more
numerous could be argued,

However, the data for the 99th

Congress House of Representatives does not support this
statement.

Indeed, the average mean for both groups of

states are almost identical, with only half a point
difference.

The immigration heavy states 9 recorded a mean

of 4.388, with a standard deviation of 2.52.

9

The other

In 1996 Congress created a 800 telephone "hotline"
pilot program for checking on immigrants employment status. The
states that were chosen for this hotline were also chosen for
this study to represent the immigrant heavy states.
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states recorded a higher mean - 4.88 - but with a lower
deviation rate, 2.41.

Thus, the hypothesis was rejected.

In considering the data set, the results from the
previous hypothesis, and the fact that Democrats had
registered as the majority party in the immigration heavy
states, I decided to rerun the equation, controlling for
party.

This was done to ensure that the Democrats who, has

previously discussed, had recorded a lower mean than the
Republicans, were not masking a higher Republican mean in
the immigrant heavy states.

The results on hypothesis

three, when controlled for party were not significant at the
95 percent level.

But the Democratic group results were

significant at the 90 percent level, and bearing this in
mind the results are given below.
The Democrat mean for the states with greater numbers
of immigrants was 3.22, with standard deviation of 2.03.
The mean for the Democrats from all other states was 3.72,
with a very similar deviation of 2.03.

Therefore, the

Democratic party figures were, although lower (as is to be
expected bearing in mind the results from hypothesis one)
were the same difference, a half a point, as the overall
results for all Representatives.
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The rerun of the data on hypothesis three, controlling
for party, did not give a statistically significant result,
at the 95 percent level, for the Republican party.

The mean

for the Republicans in the immigrant state group was 5.98,
with a standard deviation of 2.26.

Continuing the fashion

of results for this hypothesis the other states recorded a
greater mean - 6.46.
was 1.98.

The standard deviation for this group

There could be a number of reasons for this

result being statistically insignificant, but the fact that
the behavior between the groups is so similar may well be
the reason.
Considering that the sub sets cannot be used, then the
third hypothesis must be rejected - as the results do not
show that Representatives from those states with greater
immigrant populations favor more restrictive immigration
laws.

In fact, the results show that, with a smaller

difference, the Representatives from other states actually
prefer more restrictive immigration laws.

It may very well

be that the immigrant heavy constituency is at work here,
with immigrants pushing for support in those areas.
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Hypothesis Four (Table 2)
The most obvious fact, when comparing the gender groups
of the 99th Congress, is that the vast majority of
Representatives are male.

Furthermore, when absenteeism is

taken into account, only 11 female Representatives where
included in the statistical comparison of gender voting
rates.

Due to this very small sample the results where not

statistically significant.

However, they are included for

descriptive purposes.
The mean for males in the 99th was 4.71, with a
deviation of 2.47.

This reading, just below the halfway

measure, makes the average male Representative in 1986 more
"Favor Immigrant" than not - although just barely.

However,

in comparison, the mean for the females included in the
sample was 5.00, with a standard deviation smaller than
their male counterparts - 2.05.

While the hypothesis could

not be statistically tested, due to the above results, and
therefore neither supported nor rejected, it can be said
that the 11 female members of the House of Representatives
included in the roll call analysis were actually slightly
more conservative (though admittedly by a very small margin)
in 1986 than their male counterparts.
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Indeed, there is no

evidence of any major gender difference in voting with
regards to immigration, not in the 99th Congress House of
Representatives.

Hypothesis Five (Table 6)
This hypothesis was able to be tested, despite the
small sample for the number of minority legislators, which
was once again further reduced due to absenteeism on the
part of several members.

Thus, the sample for minority

legislators contained only 23 cases.
The results showed a clear, statistically significant
difference between the two groups.

The non-minority group

scored a mean of 4.82, with a standard deviation of 2.48.
In comparison, the numbers for the minority members were
much smaller in both cases.

With a mean result of 3.13 and

a standard deviation of only 1.51, the minority
Representatives were clearly much more in support of
immigrants than their non minority House members.

The

difference between the two, 1.69, shows a clear identifiable
gap.

Not only that, but the minority group are also much

more cohesive, showing less of a range than their
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counterparts.

Therefore, Hypothesis Five is supported -

minority Representatives do favor less restrictive
immigration laws than do other Representatives.

However,

the minority group of legislators is actually made up of
several smaller groups.

In order to examine the behavior of

these subgroups, Hypothesis Six was also tested.

Hypothesis Six (Table 6)
This hypothesis compared the voting behavior of
Hispanic and African American legislators.

Due to the very

small number of Hispanic legislators elected to the 99th
Congress any comparison would not be statistically
significant.

Therefore, Hypothesis Six could not be tested

with the 1986 data set.

However, a comparison of all of the

ethnic groups considered was undertaken to consider the
differences between them.
This provided the following four groups for study:

White,

non minority Representatives ( n=333), African American
Representatives (n=l6), Hispanic Representatives (n=5) and
Asian Representatives (n=2) .

Due to the small number of

Hispanic and Asian legislators they were compared
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separately, and any results drawn from the equation are not
statistically significant.
The non minority Representatives had a mean result of
4.82, and the highest standard deviation score overall 2.48.

The African American legislators had the lowest

overall mean for minority legislators, averaging 2.93, with
a standard deviation of 1.52.

This result is somewhat

surprising in light of the literature on immigration stances
within the minority community.

The Hispanic Representatives

would have been expected to have a lower mean than the
African American members, as the two communities have often
been considered to be at odds with each other, and African
American legislators have often supported greater
immigration controls than other minority Representatives.
However, the Hispanic mean of 3.8 is almost a full point
higher (although the deviation of 1.63 for Hispanics is very
similar to the African American result) .

The Asian mean was

3.00, with a standard deviation of 1.41.

However, as

mentioned above, the hypothesis itself could not be tested
in light of the limited data provided from the 99th
Congress.
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Hypothesis Seven (Table 5)
The ages of the Representatives of the 99th House were
the most wide ranging of all the variables.

In order to

compare the differing attitudes of the older and younger
representatives they were combined into two major groups the 54 and under group, and those 55 and over.

Somewhat

disappointing is the fact that once again the results
obtained were not statistically significant - in any of the
cases.

Therefore, it would seem that age has no effect.

A

discussion of the results will provide for a view of any
minor age related differences nonetheless.
Before controlling for party the results provided us
with two groups with very similar voting behavior.

The

younger group recorded a mean of 4.78 with a standard
deviation of 2.44

This was closely matched by their older

brethren who had a slightly lower mean of 4.59, and an
almost like, but slightly higher deviation of 2.51.
Therefore, across party lines, there is bare difference
between the two groups.
The Democrats had, in keeping with all previous
results, a lower mean score as a party, in both cases.
younger Democrats had a mean score of 3.61.
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The

This was almost

identical to the older Democrats mean score of 3.44.

The

deviation with the groups was also extremely close, 2.06 and
1.99, respectively.

Thus, although not statistically

significant, the results are that younger Democrats actually
score a higher mean than their elders in the party.

The two

groups are split between the elders (who come from the WWII
generation, and before) and the younger groups, which starts
with, and is mostly comprised of baby boomers.
The same does not hold true for the House Republicans
in the 99th Congress, the younger members having a lower
mean than their older party members.
the differences are very small.

Once again, however,

The younger Republicans had

a mean result of 6.26, with a deviation of 2.04.

The older

group had a mean score only one tenth of a point higher,
6.36, and an almost alike deviation of 2.20.

So, although

the hypothesis was not tested, the results, on their face,
do not support such a contention in 1986.

Analysis of 1996 Data
The 1996 data set showed a number of changes from
Congresses of previous years.

The face of the average

United States Congressional Representative had not changed
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dramatically, but it had nonetheless changed.

The average

Representative was still a Congressman, but the number of
women had jumped significantly; there were 44 female
legislators contained within the data set.

The ethnic

makeup of the 104th Congress was still overwhelmingly non
minority with 87.4 percent of the body being white.
However, the data set now included 34 African American
legislators and 14 Hispanics.

The ages of the various

Representatives were still providing the classic bell curve
style, with the 45 to 54 year olds still comprising the
largest single group.
Of course, the biggest difference of the 104th Congress
was the party makeup.

The House now saw a Republican

majority; indeed, several of its members had not been alive
the last time that this had taken place.

Considering the

results from the previous data set, these changes could mean
much in the discussion and testing of the various
hypothesis.

Another factor that could affect the results

was the state influence.

Due to the population changes

within the last census, California alone now comprised 12
percent of the House of Representatives and California has
long been on the "front line" of the immigration issue.
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The

question could be asked why California is more hostile than
New York, which also has a large immigrant population.
There are several possible answers to this question, but
perhaps the most important could be that New York City sees
the largest concentration of immigrants, and recent
immigrants, in one place.

California has several immigrant

communities spread all over the southern part of the state.
The 1996 data set provided several interesting
statements.

With 91 percent of the House providing full

roll call voting records, the data set was well rounded in
many respects.

The total vote record showed a grouping at

both ends of the spectrum, with only 16.7 percent falling
into the middle values.

Indeed, 49.5 percent of the

Representatives scored 7 or over on the overall Favor/Not
Favor Immigrant values.

39 Representatives scored a 10

(perfect Not Favor voting record) closely followed by 43
members who scored a nine.

At the other end of the scale 28

Representatives scored zero (a perfect Favor Immigrant
voting record) closely followed by 34 like minded
individuals who scored one.
A pattern of more restrictive immigration voting seems
to be evident solely from an analysis of the overall
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picture.

An examination of the individual hypothesis will

now test this statement.

Hypothesis One (Table 1)
With the Republicans now in the majority it could well be
surmised that the majority of legislation, if Hypothesis one
is supported, will be Not Favor immigrant in nature.
Although not all of the bills/amendments/motions to be voted
on on the House floor are presented by the majority party,
it is a simple fact of political life that the majority of
them are, and these are the ones also destined to pass.
Therefore, with a higher number of Not Favor Immigrant
votes, the Not Favor Immigrant party, which according to
hypothesis one, are the Republicans, should record a high
mean.

The results of the data set confirm both this

statement and the hypothesis in question.
The Republicans score both a high mean, 8.10, and a low
standard deviation, 1.66.

This is in direct comparison to

the Democratic mean of 3.27 and the Democratic deviation of
2.75.

With such a clear difference of over four and one

half points, the statement that Republicans favor more
restrictive immigration laws than do Democrats cannot be in
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doubt in this case.

Not only are Republicans more in favor

of restrictive immigration laws than Democrats, but they
also vote in a much more cohesive manner on the issue than
do the Democrats.

Hypothesis Two (Table 3)
The conservative coalition of southern Democrats and
Republicans has led to many comparisons of the voting record
of those Democrats from the old states of Dixie.

In the

104th Congress there is very little difference between the
voting behavior of these two groups.

Furthermore, the

result was not statistically significant, and the hypothesis
cannot be supported.
The Southern Democrats had a mean of 3.80, with a
fairly high deviation of 3.34.

The deviation for the

Democrats from the other regions was lower, at 2.45, but the
mean was very similar indeed, 3.08.

Therefore, by an

examination of behavior it would seem that on the issue of
immigration there is very little regional difference in the
Democratic party - except perhaps that the Southern
Democrats tend to be less cohesive as a unit when it comes
to immigration voting.

It could be surmised therefore, that
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the southern coalition is gone - at least with regards to
the immigration issue.

Hypothesis Three (Table 4)
The Representatives from the immigration heavy states
did have a fairly high mean of 5.24.
standard deviation of 3.5.

They also had a wide

This would certainly seem to

make them more in favor of restrictive immigration policies
than not.

However, the Representatives from the non

immigrant heavy states had a higher mean of 6.30, and
although they also had a wide standard deviation it was
smaller than the comparison group at 3.07.

So, it would

seem that in the 104th Congress the Representatives from the
states will less immigrant populations actually pref er more
restrictive immigration laws.
One major factor must be taken into consideration with
this result.

There could be a significant influence of

partisanship in the result; the Republican Representatives
have already recorded a much higher mean than their
Democratic counterparts. In light of this, party was
controlled for and the hypothesis was tested again.
Republican Representatives from the first group (the
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The

immigrant heavy states) had a mean score of 7.90, in
comparison to their Democratic counterparts mean of only
2.42.

The partisan deviations were only 0.36 apart, with

the Republicans having the lowest with a 2.00 deviation.
But, once again, the other groups, in both party cases, had
higher means.

The Republicans in the second group had a

mean of 8.20, and a much smaller deviation of 1.45.

The

Democrats in the second group had a mean higher than the
Democrats in the first, recording 3.81.

They also had the

highest deviation for all four of the groups, with 3.81.
While the Democratic result was statistically significant at
the 95 percent level, the Republican result was not.
Therefore, the hypothesis can be rejected overall, and
can be rejected for the Democratic party in particular.
the case of Republican Representatives the hypothesis has
not been rejected or supported.

It could be argued that

this is because the results of the two sub-groups are so
similar that the regional, or constituency, influence has
very little effect on a Republican Representative when it
comes to the immigration issue.
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In

Hypothesis Four (Table 2)
As mentioned above, there were 44 female
Representatives included in the overall data set.

Only 39

of them recorded a vote, or stance, on all ten roll call
votes studied.
the hypothesis.

This provided a large enough sample to test
The result was that women in Congress did

indeed prefer less restrictive immigration laws than their
male counterparts.

The female mean was 4.02, with a

standard deviation of 3.21.

Although the male deviation was

only 0.01 higher, their mean was over two full points higher
at 6.12.

Therefore, the hypothesis is supported for the

104th Congress.
It is possible that there were other factors that could
have affected the voting behavior of the female
Representatives.

It could well be that party, minority

status, or even age, could have all played roles in their
voting record.

This was not testable due to the fact that

subdivision of the female group did not provide enough
examples within each sub group to test.

So, beyond stating

that women do prefer less restrictive immigration policies
than men, no other statement can be made.
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Hypothesis Five (Table 6)
The minority representation within the 104th Congress
was, in comparison with previous years, fairly significant.
In all 46 minority Representatives could be included in the
sample.

These 46 individuals recorded one of the smallest

means in the study, having an average total vote score of
1.93.

This was very much in contrast with the non minority

mean of 6.47.

The difference of over four and a one half

points provides a clear contrast in the voting behavior of
Representatives based on their race/ethnic status.

The

deviation for each group was very alike, with the minority
group having the smallest deviation of 2.54, only 0.4 points
lower than their counterparts.
The hypothesis can be fully supported - minority
Representatives do favor less restrictive immigration laws
than their fellow non minority Representatives, and support
restrictive laws, such as those proposed and passed in the
104th Congress, by a much smaller level.

Hypothesis Six (Table 6)
Minority Representation is not monolithic in nature.
The interests of the African American Community and the
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Hispanic community are not identical.

Therefore, the

hypothesis that Hispanics would favor less restrictive
immigration laws than African Americans was also tested.

It

cannot be accepted or rejected though, mainly due to the
small number of Hispanic legislators.
roll call vote scores.

Only 14 recorded full

However, of those 14 the average

mean was the lowest mean in the study - 0.857.

The Hispanic

group also recorded the lowest standard deviation of all 0.864.

Indeed, no Hispanic Representative, irrespective of

state, party, or gender, recorded a total vote score above
2, and several had a perfect zero.

On the issue of

immigration the Hispanic Representatives deserted their
party colleagues and voted with their minority bedfellows.
The African American legislators also achieved a very
low mean of only 1.93, although their deviation was much
higher at 2.65.

So, in examined behavior these two minority

groups are very much in favor of less restrictive
immigration policies than the non minority House Members.
This was not the case for the Asian Representatives.

Three

Asians recorded a mean score of 3.66, with a wide ranging
deviation of 5.50.

It would seem that the Asian

Representatives range widely in individual behavior.
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Hypothesis Seven (Table 5)

An overall comparison of the voting behavior of the
different age groups in the 104th Congress did not prove
significant.

The hypothesis examined this behavior at the

party level, however, and here the results for the
Republican party did prove to be marginally significantw.
This did mean that the hypothesis was proven.

On the other

hand, with the older group of Republicans in the 104th
Congress having a mean of 8.36, in comparison to their
younger colleagues mean of 7.96, the older, non minority
Republicans had the edge on preferring more restrictive
immigration laws.

Both had very small deviation within each

sub group - the older group being more cohesive by 0.32,
with a standard deviation of 1.43.
The Democrats, even though their data was not
statistically significant also gave an opposite view of the
proposed hypothesis.

The younger non minority Democrats had

a mean of 3.55, just under a point higher than their older
colleagues score of 2.89.

The deviations were almost

identical, the younger group being 0.01 point lower at 2.73.

w

0.088.

The actual significance of this cross tabulation was
The Democratic variable had a significance of 0.114.
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Chapter Five
Temporal Comparison of Voting Behavior

The two data sets clearly provide the view of a
changing pattern of immigration voting.
provide a view of a changing Congress.

Moreover, they
An examination of

the Representatives from the 99th Congress and the 104th
Congress shows us more - more women, more African Americans,
more Hispanics, and more Republicans.

In most cases the

growth is not significant in real numbers, but in percentage
growth it is often huge.

Also, the changes as to how the

House as a whole, and how Representatives as individuals,
operate have been well recorded elsewhere.

There have been

many reforms, both as an institution, and with the new
Republican majority, in how the majority party operates.
Another significant change is the drop in absenteeism
rates on the selected roll call votes.

In the selected

votes from 1986, 79 House members had incomplete records.
By 1996 this number had dropped by half to 39 - a
significant change in vote attendance of just over 50
percent.
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All of these changes reflect upon the House in general.
In regards to changes on immigration voting in particular,
there are also significant findings.

The cohesiveness of

both parties within the House have also changed.

In 1986

the House had, as had been the standard for some time, a
Democratic majority.

With this majority the Democrats also

had the lowest deviation rate of 2.03, with their respected
opponents across the aisle being fairly similar at a rate of
2.09.

In 1996 the House majority party, now the Republicans

also had the lowest deviation rate, which stood at a low
1.66.

In contrast to this, the Democrats had seen their

cohesiveness disappear, and they now recorded a standard
deviation on immigration issues of 2.75.
lost the majority now seemed to have

A party that had

lost some of the glue

that held that majority together.
The age groups of Representatives had also undergone
changes.

In 1986 both parties had a ratio of almost 2:1 in

favor of the under 54 crowd.

But, in 1996, only two years

after the "fabled" entrance of the Republican freshman class
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of 1994 the over 55 Representatives had grown in size - in
both parties. 11
I shall now examine each separate hypothesis, by
directly comparing the results from each separate data set,
bearing in mind Hypothesis Eight; The Data from the 99th
Congress and the Data from the 104th Congress will show a
shift towards a more restrictive view of immigration in the
House of Representatives, at all levels, and within all
groups.

Comparison of Hypothesis One (Table 1)
The party scores show two distinct movements.

As

discussed above, the cohesiveness of both parties have
changed.

The Republicans have become more cohesive in their

voting on immigration since they have become the majority
party, while the Democrats have moved in the opposite
direction.

But, most important of all, is the obvious shift

of the Republican majority towards a more restrictive view
of immigration.

This is especially important as they are

now the party in control of the House agenda.

11

Nonetheless, the Republicans were the "youngest" party
in terms of younger members - the largest group of over 55+ being
Democrats, who comprised 42 percent of their House caucus.
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The Democrats, in direct contrast to the stated
hypothesis have actually moved towards a less restrictive
stance on immigration - although this movement has been
fairly small and accompanied by a larger growth in the party
standard deviation rates on immigration voting.

The

movements by the parties do not bode well for those
individuals who support a more liberal view of immigration
in the United States

Comparison of Hypothesis Two (Table 3.1)
The argument over a possible realignment of the voting
behavior of the South of the United States has not been made
in this paper; it is well recorded and discussed elsewhere
What can be discussed, and has been highlighted, is the
difference in the voting behavior of Southern Democrats and
their party colleagues from the North.

The obvious

differences between the two groups was well displayed in the
immigration voting behavior of the 99th Congress.

However,

by the 104th Congress this behavior had changed to such a
level that it was difficult to attach any statistical
significance to the results between the two groups.

This is

possibly due to the fact that the differences between the
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groups had become almost non-existent.

Whatever the

fortunes of the Democratic party in the South, there seems
to be a lessening of regional differences when it comes to
the immigration issue.

Although we can attach no

statistical significance to the results from 1996 it is
important to note that the mean figures dropped, once again
the Democrats have not agreed with the proposed hypothesis
statement.

It is also interesting to note that the

deviation rates for the Democrats (in both areas) rose
again, a pattern that seems to be repeating itself.

Comparison of Hypothesis Three (Table 3.1)
Another look at regions, first across party lines, also
recorded some interesting changes.

Even though the

hypothesis was rejected in both cases, there was a clear
movement by both regional groups of Representatives to move
towards a more restrictive view of immigration.

Not only

that, but the Representatives from the Non Immigrant Heavy
states actually increased their support for restrictive laws
at a greater rate than their opposite numbers.

At the same

time, the Representatives from Immigrant Heavy states saw a
significant increase in their deviation rates - perhaps an

73

indication that the voting in those areas has become more
extreme - at both ends, rather than just supportive of less
restrictive laws.
In examining the changes when accounting for party the
Democrats have become more supportive of restrictive
immigration laws, in both groups, but only by very small
increments, almost non-existent in the less immigrant
populated state group.

At the same time their deviation

rate as a party has increased again.

This latter fact is

fast becoming a staple trend in each hypothesis.
On the other hand the Republicans' behavior has yet
again not proven to be statistically significant.

But, on

face value, it can be seen that they have increased their
support, in both groups, for restrictive immigration
policies - at a higher rate than their Democratic
counterparts.

Also, their deviation rates have fallen in

both areas, keeping in line with the party norm.

Comparison of Hypothesis Four (Table 2)
The significant increase in the number of female
Representatives between 1986 and 1996 made the results for
the second data set just that - significant.
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What is

L

noteworthy is that the female group, like the Democratic
group in Congress,

(the two, of course, overlap heavily)

moved against the majority tide and recorded a lower mean
for the 104th Congress, unlike their male counterparts, who
recorded a fairly significant rise.

This is tempered by the

fact that both groups also saw a fairly significant rise in
the deviation rates.

There can be no doubt, though, that

there is a clear difference in voting behavior on
immigration based on gender, and that Hypothesis Four is
clearly supported in 1996.

Comparison of Hypothesis Five {Table 4)
The comparison of the minority and non-minority voting
behavior provides one of the most contrasting examples of
voting behavior on immigration issue in either Congress.
This is most clearly the case in 1996.

During the ten year

period between data sets both groups moved, in opposite
directions.

While the non-minority group has supported the

final hypothetical statement, the minorities have not.

They

are now the most obvious supporters of less restrictive
immigration policies, with their voting record having
shifted almost fifty percent in favor of more restrictive
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policies.

Once again this drop in the mean has also seen a

rise in the corresponding deviation.

The deviation rate for

minorities is still fairly small, compared to other
identifiable groups (such as the Democrats, or female
Representatives) but the rise is still fairly strong.
There can be, however, no argument over the difference
between minorities and non-minorities when it comes to
voting on immigration issues; the almost five point gap
provides a clear battle line based on minority status that
crosses all other lines, party, gender, age or region.

Comparison of Hypothesis Six (Table 4)
An examination of the separate minorities supports the

assertions made above.
supports Hypothesis Six.

Such an examination also clearly
The Hispanic Representatives in

Congress not only recorded a much smaller mean in the 104th
Congress, their group deviation was almost nonexistent.
While both the African American group and the Hispanic group
record low support for restrictive immigration policies
there is a significant drop in that support by the Hispanic
group.

Like the Democratic party (to which the majority of

both minorities, but not all, belong) they have recorded a
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drop in their mean, against the stated hypothesis, and the
Hispanics have done so while recording a drop in their
deviation rates - no other group has done that in this
study . 12

Comparison of Hypothesis Seven (Table 5)
The hypothesis based on age was not proven due to the
fact that all but one of the data set results proved to be
statistically insignificant.

Although a discussion of their

face value shows that, overall, they rise in both mean
support for restrictive immigration policies, and deviation
rates within the two groups.
At the party level, the Democrats again, by recorded
action, disprove the hypothesis in question.

The mean for

each age group did drop between the 99th and 104th
Congresses, but once again the deviation rates for the
Democrats rose - in direct contrast to the deviation rates
of the Republicans which fell.

Indeed, the one

statistically significant cross tabulation of hypothesis

12

While not included in the hypothesis, and the results
not being statistically significant, it is interesting to note
that the Asian Representatives went against the majority tide.
In recording a higher mean in 1996 they also recorded the highest
deviation of any identified group.
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seven was the 1996 comparison of older and younger
Republicans.

Both groups had higher means, and lower

deviations, than their counterparts in the 99th Congress.
But, in contrast to what many would, expect, the older
Republican party members in the 104th Congress recorded a
higher mean than their younger counterparts.

It would seem

that the fabled GOP "freshman" are either less ideologically
right wing on immigration than is generally thought, or that
the group contains a number of older members.
All in all, Hypothesis Seven was rejected, due in all
but one case to insufficient statistical data, and in the
other by the proven statistical behavior of older, nonminority Republicans.

Hypothesis Eight
The support for Hypothesis Eight has proven to be
great.

The tables below provide example after example of

growing support for restrictive immigration policies.
Although a few groups have recorded declines of various
sizes in their mean score, such changes are either small in
scale, or the groups themselves are small in number.
the fact that the majority party (Republicans) and the
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Also,

majority ethnic and gender group (non-minority males) have
recorded significant increases in their means outweighs any
gains for the pro immigrant groups.
Also, an examination of Table six provides a glaring
example of the changes in immigration policy and support for
immigration restrictions.

The clear polarization that has

occurred between 1986 and 1996, and the fact that this
polarization has been rather one sided, leaves very little
doubt about where the vast majority of Representatives stood
in the 104th Congress.

The percentage increases in those

Representatives scoring eight or above, when compared to
those scoring three or below, is staggering when one
considers that the period of time that involved such a move
was a scant ten years.

Clearly, Hypothesis Eight, while not

overwhelmingly supported (the increase in support for more
restrictive immigration laws has not occurred at all levels,
or within all groups) is supported.
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Table 1
Party Scores for Immigration Roll Call Voting in the 99th
and 104th Congresses - 1986, 1996.

Party

Dem.

1986

1986

1996

1996

Mean

Deviation

Mean

Deviation

3.55**

2.03

3.27**

2.75

( 1 79)

(205)

Rep.

6.29**

2.09

8.10**

(21 7)

(151)

*

Significant at the 0.10 level.

**

Significant at the 0.05 level.

***

Significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 2
Gender scores on Immigration Roll Call voting in the 99th
and 104th Congresses - 1986, 1996.

Male

Males

1986

1986

1996

1996

Mean

Deviation

Mean

Deviation

4.71

2.47

6.12***

3.22

(345)
Females

5.00

(356)
2.04

4.02***

( 11)

( 3 9)

* Significant at the 0.10 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.

81

3.21

Table 3
Regional Scores for Immigration Roll Call Voting in the 99th
and 104th Congresses - 1986, 1996.

Party

1986

1986

1996

1996

Mean

Deviation

Mean

Deviation

4.82***

2.13

3.80

3.43

Dem.
(South)

( 4 7)

(63)
Dem.
(North)

2.99***

3.08

1. 72

(132)

(142)
IM"

4.38

2.52

5.24***

( 121)
Non-IM

4.88

2.45

3.50

(144)
2.41

6.30***

(235)

3.07***

(252)

* Significant at the 0.10 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
" Those states regarded by Congress as immigrant heavy.
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Table 4
Regional Scores for Immigration Roll Call Voting in the 99th
and 104th Congresses - 1986, 1996. Controlling for Party.

Party

IM" (D)

1986

1986

1996

1996

Mean

Deviation

Mean

Deviation

3.22*

2.03

2.42***

2.36

( 70)
Non-IM(D) 3.72*

(70)
2.02

3.81***

(135)
IM" (R)

5.98

(109)
2.26

7.90

( 51)
Non-IM(R) 6.46

2.85

2.00

(74)
1. 98

8.20

( 100)

1.45

(143)

" Those states regarded by Congress as Immigrant Heavy.

*

Significant at the 0.10 level.

**

Significant at the 0.05 level.

***

Significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 5
Immigration Roll Call Voting Comparison by Age in the 99th
and 104th Congress - 1986, 1996.

Age

Under 54

1986

1986

1996

1996

Mean

Deviation

Mean

Deviation

4.78

2.44

6.06

3.12

(23 9)

(23 7)
55 Plus

4.59

2.51

5.69

3.49

(156)

(119)
Controlling for Party ...
Dem.
Under 54

3.61

2.06

3.55

(133)
55 Plus

3.44

2.73

(103)
1. 99

2.89

(72)

2.74

(76)

Rep.
Under 54

6.26

2.04

7.96*

(104)
55 Plus

6.36

(136)
2.20

8.36*
( 80)

( 4 7)

*

1. 76

Significant at the 0.10 level.
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1.43

Table 6
Immigration Roll Call Voting Comparison by Minority Status
in the 99th and 104th Congresses - 1986, 1996.

Status

Non

1986

1986

1996

1996

Mean

Deviation

Mean

Deviation

4.82***

2.48

6.47***

2.49

( 333)
African-

2.93***

American

(16)

Hispanic

3.80

(349)
1. 52

1.93***
( 29)

1. 64

0.85*

3.00

0.86

(14)

( 5)

Asian

2.65

1.41

3.66

( 2)

( 3)

* Significant at the 0.10 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
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5.50

Table 7
Actual Score of All Representatives for Selected Roll Call
Votes

Total #

# of 1986 Reps.

# of 1996 Reps.

% Change

0

3

28

933

1

27

34

26

2

48

26

-46

3

63

27

-57

4

39

20

-49

5

40

19

-52

6

30

27

-10

7

39

36

-8

8

46

66

43

9

19

70

370

2

43

2150

79

39

435

435

10

No Total

Total

The total figure is the sum of each representative Favor Immigrant/Not
Favor Immigrant voting record.
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Chapter Six
Conclusion

The changes in immigration law that have taken place
within the last ten years have been almost staggering in
their volume.

In 1995 - 1996 alone, there were three major

immigration reform bills passed and signed into law by the
United States government.

All of these bills have been, in

general, more restrictive in nature than the existing
framework and regulations then in place.

The changes have

been so fast and furious that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service has been unable to advise immigration
groups or lawyers about what the (then) current law means.
These changes have been one indication of the changing
nature of the support for immigration, and related
immigration policies, within the United States Congress.
This study has been another.

An overview of the hypotheses, supported or not, upon
which this study is based has shown great movement towards a
more restrictive view of immigration overall.
The results from the various statistical analysis show
major support for Hypothesis Eight.

Upon close examination,

it can be seen that the support for more restrictive
immigration policies has grown between the time of the 99th
Congress and the time of the 104th Congress.
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Except for a

few exceptions, this support has transcended regional and
party lines.

While the Democratic mean actually dropped,

the change in deviation shows that support for more
restrictive immigration policies is not confined to the
Republican party alone.
We are left with the question of what the data results
mean.
things.

In considering the results we should consider two
First the changes in support for immigration reform

(read restrictions) , and second, the changes in the tone and
nature of the legislation.

There can be very little doubt

by examining the vote synopsis in Appendix A that the
language of the debate in the 104th Congress was much more
severe in nature than that of the 99th.

Plus, the intent of

the majority of 1996 immigration bills supporters was to
restrict immigration, both legal and illegal, give greater
authority to remove immigrants, again from either group,
within the United States, and restrict the rights and
privileges of those now in the United States, or likely to
come in the future.

The most obvious conclusion that one

can make from all of the above data and examination is that
the congressional support for restrictive immigration has
grown considerably in the last few years and the supporters
of restrictive immigration policies now constitute a large
majority of the House of Representatives of the United
States.
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It can also be clearly concluded that the immigration
issue has become more and more a factitious one, and that
divisions within parties, and other identifiable groups
exist within the U.S. House.

Also, the supporters for

greater restrictions on immigration, and the detractors from
these policies have become more extreme in their recorded
behavior.

A clear polarization in the debate has occurred.

However, these conclusions are based upon a study that,
like any study, is not complete nor exhaustive.

Perhaps one

of the most obvious shortcomings of this study is that, as
with many roll call studies, it does not address every
immigration roll call vote taken in the respective
congresses.

Rather, it is based upon a numerical

representation and shorter selection of the votes available.
It may well be that the inclusion of all immigration votes
taken in the House during the 99th and 104 Congress would
provide a deeper insight into the behavior and manner of
such voting.
Also, the limitation of variables within the study has
also restricted the results and the view of my analysis into
the 99th and 104th Congress.

With only five variables on

each Representative, the limitations on any further
examination are numerous.

The presence, or perhaps I should

say absence, of larger groups of minorities and women in the
respective congresses also restricts my ability to comment
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on their behavior.

With a smaller group to study it is

often difficult to portray that behavior as truly
representative of either minorities or women.

Rather, it is

only a representation of those specific individuals.

Future Possibilities for Study
Given the limitations stated above, there are several
ways in which this study could benefit from further growth.
Given the time and resources, a full analysis of all roll
call votes on immigration issues in the 99th and 104th
Congress could be made.

An

increase in the number of

individual variables, and a further definition of some of
the current variables could also be made. These could
include such things as an examination of the nature of each
Representatives' constituency, consideration of the presence
of any foreign born Representatives (there are some), the
actual number of immigrants that are present within
constituencies, and the consideration of the electoral
margin at the last general election.
The statistical tools employed in the analysis of the
data could also be increased.

With greater information and

data at hand, and a more in depth study, the next step would
be a multi-variate analysis and the creation of roll call
models to explain, and predict, voting behavior of
Representatives on immigration issues.
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This study is

important in that it provides an insight into the changing
ideological balance within the United States House of
Representatives regarding immigration, and the rights of
immigrants.

It clearly shows a movement towards a more

conservative viewpoint on the part of the 104th Congress,
and on the part of the Republican majority in that chamber.
Further study, and deeper analysis of the results could
yield a greater understanding of why and how these changes
have taken place.
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Appendix A

Selected Roll Call Votes

Selected 1986 Votes
The following ten votes were selected from the larger
number of recorded roll call votes that were taken in
relation to the house legislation, and the conference
report.

All the recorded roll call votes were considered

and the final ten listed below were selected as being a
representative group which would provide wide ranging
examples of support for or against particular immigration
controls or regulations.

(See previous footnote).

An

indication of the President's position is given only if one
was known.

Each vote is labeled with the CQ House Vote

number from the 1986 CQ Almanac.

H413 - Adoption of House Resolution 580
The vote was to adopt House Resolution 580 to provide for
House floor consideration of and to waive points of order
against the bill to revise the nation's immigration laws.
The vote was in favor of adoption by 278-129.

The

Republicans were almost evenly split, 88-81, while the
Democrats were more solidly aligned for, with a vote of 19048.
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H415 - Amendment to the Bill - Bartlett (R-TX)
The vote was on an amendment to allow civil, rather than
criminal, penalties for those employers who knowingly engage
in the practice, or have a practice of hiring undocumented
or illegal aliens.

It was rejected by a vote of 137-264,

with the Democrats voting three to one against but the
Republicans being much more evenly split with only a 26 vote
difference between support and rejection.

H416 - Amendment to Strike Provisions - Sensenbrenner (R-WI)
The vote was on an amendment to strike the provisions which
barred discrimination based on citizenship status, and also
upon setting up a special Justice Department off ice to
investigate and prosecute non-citizen bias claims against
employers.

Those voting Yea were in support of the

President's position.

The amendment was rejected by a vote

of 140-260 with strong partisan differences.

Only 25

Democrats supported the amendment and only 54 Republicans
opposed it.

H417 - Amendment to the Bill - De la Garza (D-TX)
The vote was on an amendment to the bill which would require
the Immigration and Naturalization Service agents and
employees to obtain warrants before searching working
parties operating in open areas and fields for those
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violating immigration laws.

Those voting Nay were in

support of the President's position.
adopted by a vote of 221-170.

The amendment was

The Republican party was

almost evenly split on the issue, with the Democrats having
45 more votes in support than not.

H418 - Amendment to the Bill - Gonzalez (D-TX)
The vote was on amendment to the bill which would have made
any family that applied for housing assistance eligible if
one member was so eligible regardless of the legal status of
other family members.

The amendment was soundly rejected by

a vote of 73-310, with only five Republicans and only 68
Democrats supporting it.

H419 - Amendment to Strike - Mccollum (R-FL)
The vote was on an amendment to strike those provisions that
would grant legal status to millions of aliens who were
currently illegal under existing law, as long as they met
specific set requirements contained within the provisions in
question.

Rejected by a very close vote of 192-199, the

Republicans were strong in support with a split of 124-40,
and the Democrats were strongly in opposition with a vote of
68-159.
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H420 - Amendment to Strike - Fish (R-NY)
The vote was on an amendment to strike the provisions of the
bill that would grant temporary refugee status to Nicaraguan
or Salvadorean citizens already in the United States.

This

was the closest vote of any of the bills included in this
study was only rejected by two votes, 197-199.

The

Republicans voted 145-22, while the Democrats were in
opposition with a stance of 52-177.

H421 - Passage of the Bill
The vote was on passage of the bill to overhaul the
immigration laws then in force.

The bill would create a

system of criminal and civil penalties against those
employers who wilfully or knowingly hire illegal or
undocumented aliens.

It would further provide legal status

to millions of aliens who were currently illegal or
undocumented but present in the United States.

A special

program was created for certain foreign born individuals who
could prove a history of working in American agriculture to
gain legal status.

The bill was passed 230-166, with solid

Democratic support of 168-61.

The Republicans opposed the

bill with a more split vote of 62-105.
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H432 - Adoption of the Rule {H Res 592)
Vote to adopt the House rule to waive any and all points of
order against House Floor consideration of the conference
report on the bill to overhaul the nation's existing
immigration laws.

Adopted by a vote of 274-132.

The

Democrats supported it overwhelmingly with a vote of 204-33.
The Republicans were very split with a vote of 70-99.

H433 - Adoption of the Conference Report
Vote to adopt the conference report.

The report contained

most of the provision in the original house legislation and
the summary of vote number H421 discussed above.

Passed by

a vote of 238-173, the Republicans vetoing 77-93 and the
Democrats split two to one in favor by voting 161-80.

Selected 1996 Votes
The following ten votes were selected from the larger
number of recorded roll call votes that were taken in
regards to the House legislation, and subsequent Conference
reports.

All the recorded roll call votes were considered

and the final ten listed below were chosen as being a
representative group which would provide wide ranging
examples of support for or against particular immigration
controls or regulations.

An indication of the Presidents
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position is given only if one was known.

Each vote is

labelled using the CQ House Vote number from the respective
CQ Weekly for that time period.

H72 - Amendment to the Bill - Mccollum {R-FL)
The vote was on amendment to direct the Social Security
Administration to alter the material used, and change the
design of, the Social Security Card.

This would be done in

an effort to improve them against fraud and counterfeiting.
Rejected by a vote of 191-221.

The main swing vote was from

Republicans, who voted 100-129, who argued this was one step
closer to a national identity card,

The Democrats were

split evenly 91-91.

H73 - Amendment to the Bill - Bryant (R-TN)
The vote was on an amendment to the bill to require medical
facilities open to the public to provide the Immigration and
Naturalization Service with information about illegal aliens
that were treated at those facilities.

This would be a

condition of receiving public monies and would be applicable
to those aged 18 and over only.
of 170-250.

It was rejected by a vote

This result was reached with strong Democratic

opposition of 9-178.

The Republicans were more in favor of

support with a vote of 161-71.
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H74 - Amendment to Strike Provisions - Velazquez (D-NY)
The vote was on an amendment to strike provisions from the
bill which provided for keeping undocumented aliens from
applying for various forms of federal or state aid (such as
food stamps) on behalf of their U.S. born children.
Receiving support from both sides of the aisle, but mainly
from the Democrats, the amendment failed 151-269.

The

Republicans were strongly opposed, 21-211, while the
Democrats were more split, 129-58.

H75 - Amendment to the Bill - Gallegly (R-CA)
The vote was on an amendment to the bill that would allow
states, if they so chose, to deny public education to
illegal aliens.

The amendment did include provisions that

would allow a challenge to schools decisions if the parents
of the child, or child, could prove they were citizens or
legally present in the U.S.

The amendment was strongly

opposed by the White House, a nay being a vote in favor of
the President's position.

The amendment passed 257-163.

The Republicans voted for overwhelming support, 213-20,
while the Democrats were more opposed, 44-142.

H76 - Amendment to Strike Provisions - Chabot (R-OH)
The vote was on an amendment to strike provisions from the
bill which established a voluntary system under which
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employers in five of the seven states with the highest
number of illegal immigrants could use a telephone system to
verify the immigrant status of employees.
rejected 159-260.

The bill was

It received equal support from both

Republicans, 79-152, and Democrats, 79-108.

H78 - Amendment to the Bill - Canady (R-FL)
The vote was on an amendment to the bill which would require
new immigrants who were arriving under the Diversity
Immigrant Program or the Employment Based Class to be able
to pass a standardized English test administered by the
Department of Education.

This was the closest vote on any

amendment to the bill and passed by three votes 210-207.
The amendment received strong support from the Republicans.
182-50, but scant support from the Democrats, 28-156.

H88 - Motion to Recommit - Bryant (D-TX)
The vote was on a motion to recommit to the House Judiciary
Committee the complete bill, with instructions to require
limitations on situations where U.S. workers could
temporarily be replaced by foreign workers.
rejected by a vote of 188-231.

The Republicans vetoing 14-

219 and the Democrats voting 173-12.
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The motion was

H89 - Motion to Pass
The vote was on a motion to pass the bill to limit legal and
illegal immigrants access to public benefits, reduce the
types of documents that could be used to prove eligibility
for employment, increase the border controls and size of
border patrols, increase penalties for fraud in immigration
cases.

The bill would also establish a voluntary telephone

system for verify employment eligibility.
of 333-87.

Passed by a vote

The Republicans voted as a block, 228-6, while

the Democrats were more divided, 105-80.

H432 - Adoption of the Conference Report
Adoption of the Conference Report on the bill which would
increase the number of border patrol agents, install fences
along the California-Mexico border, and make it easier to
detain and deport illegal immigrants.

The bill also imposed

higher income requirements on sponsors of illegal immigrants
(up to two times the poverty level), and deny federal
programs to both illegal and legal immigrants.
sent to the Senate by a vote of 305-123.

Adopted and

The Republican

vote was a solid 229-5, while the Democrats were in
opposition to the bill, 76-117).
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H433 - HR 4134 Passage of the Bill
The vote was on passage of HR 4134, which was originally
part of HR 2202.

This bill would allow states to bar

illegal immigrant children from public education, effective
as of July 1, 1997.

States would not be permitted to bar

children who had already started their schooling from
finishing that current phase.

A vote of nay was in

agreement with the President's stated position.

The bill

was passed by a vote of 254-175. with the Republicans voting
213-21, and the Democrats 41-153.
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Appendix B

Vote Coding Lists

A score of 1 indicates a Not Favor Immigrant stance
A score of O indicates a Favor Immigrant stance.

1986 Vote Coding List
Hl6

Yes Vote
No Vote

H415 Yes Vote

No Vote
H416 Yes Vote

No Vote
H417 Yes Vote

No Vote
H418 Yes Vote

No Vote
H419 Yes Vote

No Vote
H420 Yes Vote

No Vote
H421 Yes Vote

No Vote
H432 Yes Vote

No Vote

1

= 0
= 1
= 0
= 1
0
0

= 1
= 1
= 0
= 1
0

= 1
= 0
= 0
= 1
= 0
1
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H433 Yes Vote
No Vote

= 0
= 1

1996 Vote Coding List
H72

H73

H74

H75

H76

H78

H88

Yes Vote

= 1

No Vote

=

Yes Vote

= 1

No Vote

=

0

Yes Vote

=

0

No Vote

=

0

Yes Vote

= 1

No Vote

=

0

Yes Vote

=

0

No Vote

= 1

Yes Vote

1

No Vote

0

Yes Vote

=

Yes Vote

= 1

No Vote
H432 Yes Vote
No Vote
H433 Yes Vote
No Vote

0

1

No Vote
H89

0

0

= 1
=

0

= 1
=

0

103

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beck, Roy. 1996. The Case Against Immigration. New York:
Norton.

Borjas, George J. 1990. Friends or Strangers. New York:
Basic.

Brownfeld, Allan C. 1993. One Answer to Terrorism: Control
Entry. New York: Harper Collins.

Carney, Dan. December 14, 1996.

Congressional Quarterly

Weekly Report, 54:49.

Carney, Dan. May 17, 1997.

Republicans Feeling the Heat As

Policy Becomes Reality. Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report, 55:20.

Carney, Dan. May 17, 1997. Immigrant Vote Swings
Democratic ... As Issues Move Front and Center.
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 55:20.

Clausen, Aage R. 1973. How Congressmen Decide: A Policy
Focus.

New York:St Martin's.

104

Crane, Jr, Wilder. 1960. A Caveat on Roll-Call Studeis of
Party Voting. Midwest Journal of Political Science,
4: 3.

Diamond, Sara. July/August 1992. Blaming the Newcomers.
Z Magazine.

Duncan, Philip, D. and Christine C. Lawrence, eds. 1995.
Politics in America, 1996. The 104th Congress.
Washington: CQ Press.

Enelow, James M. 1983. A New Theory of Congressional
Compromise. The American Political Science Review.
78:3.

Erikson, Robert S. 1971. The Electoral Impact of
Congressional Roll Call Voting. The American Political
Science Review, 65:4.

Fenno, Richard F. 1978. Home Style: House Members in Their
Districts. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1974. Representatives, Roll Calls, and
Constituencies. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.

105

Fiorina, Morris P. 1997. Professionalism, Realignment, and
Representation. American Political Science Review,
91:1.

Greenstein, Fred I. and Alton F. Jackson. 1963. A Second
Look at the Validity of Roll Call Analysis. Midwest
Journal of Political Science, 7:2.

Harrison, Lawrence E. 1992. Who Prospers? New York: Basic.

Holbrook, Thomas, M. and Emily Van Dunk. 1993. Electoral
Competition in the American States. American Political
Science Review, 87:4.

House Votes. 1987.

1986 Congressional Quarterly Almanac.

Washington: CQ Press.

House Votes. March 23, 1996. Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report, 54:12.

House Votes. September 28, 1996. Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report, 54:39.

106

Idelson, Holly. March 23, 1996. House Votes To Crack Down On
Illegal Immigrants. Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report, 54:12.

Isbister, John. 1996. The Immigration Debate: Remaking
America.

West Hartford, CT: Kumarian.

Jackson, John E. 1974. Constituencies and Leaders in
Congress. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P

Jackson, John E. and David C. King. 1989. Public Goods,
Private Interests and Representation. American
Political Science Review, 83:4.

James, Daniel. 1991. Illegal Immigration: An Unfolding
Crisis. Lanham, MD: UP of America.

Kau, James B. and Paul H. Rubin. 1982. Congressmen,
Constituents and Contributors: Determinants of Roll
Call Voting in the House of Representatives. Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff.

Kingdon, John W. 1992. Congressmen's Voting Decisions. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan.

107

Leone, Bruno, and William Barbour, eds. 1994. Illegal
Immigration. San Diego:Greenhaven.

Mann, Jim. March 16, 1993. Chines Refugees Take to High
Seas.

Los Angeles Times.

Masci, David. March 23, 1996. Immigration Draft OK'd by
Panel. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 54:12.

Matthews, Donald R. and James A. Stimson. 1975. Yeas and
Nays: Normal Decision-Making in the U.S. House of
Representatives. New York: Wiley.

McRae, Jr, Duncan. 1958. Dimensions of Congressional Voting:
A Statistical Study of the House of Representatives in
the Eighty-first Congress. Berkely, CA: University of
California.

Shannon, W. Wayne. 1968. Party, Constituency and
Congressional Voting. Baton Rouge: Lousiana State U.P.

Stonecash, Jeffrey M. and Anna M. Agathangelou. 1997. Trends
in the Partisan Composition of State Legislatures: A
Response to Fiorina. American Political Science Review,
91:1.
108

Tolbert, Caroline J. and Rodney E. Hero. 1997.
Race/Ethnicity and Direct Democracy: Am Analysis of
California's Illegal Immigration Initiative. The
Journal of Politics, 58:3.

U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform. July 7, 1995. Legal
Immigration: Setting Priorities. Washington: Government
Printing Office.

U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims.
May 17, 1995. Legal Immigration reform Proposals. 104th
Congress, 1st Session. Washington: Government Printing
Office.

U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims.
May 24, 1995. Members Forum on Immigration. 104th
Congress, 1st

Session. Washington: Government Printing

Off ice

Weisberg, Herbert F. 1978. Evaluating Theories of
Congressional

Roll-Call Voting. American Journal of

Political Science, 22:3.

Wildavsky, Aaron B. ed. 1969. The Presidency. Boston: Little
Brown.
109

